Whether one blames HassAoun or Hariri, The Lebanese sectarian system has broken down; as each side develops their own media and identity, they will soon evolve separate economies. As each leader has now retreated to their own community, a pattern emerges; a communitarian alliance, grouped around “March 14th”, is facing off a challenge led by Hezb and the PSNS, with Aoun, Franjieh, and others reduced to mere fig leafs.
Nasrallah's not a revolution; Kamal Joumblat, who knew a thing or two about it, famously stated that a "revolution is about contributing something beautiful". Shater Hassan's whole mess can only go south, literally, Shater Hassan is not merely looking “outside” to balance the fast mounting hostility “inside”; he desperately needs a war to reinvigorate his long lost legitimacy. Following up on his instructions to revive the “resistance”, his minions are already probing, striving to find the best way to reignite
Whether we like or dislike the Syrian regime, we have to realize that they are forced to stick to their simple bottom line; Assad has little choice but to sticks to his uncompromising stance and “does not want to hear of the Hariri tribunal”. Unless you intend to talk about talking about it.
To outsiders, this obstinacy in sticking to such a maximalist position may seem baffling, but to anyone with a sense of history, this is the only logical option left to Bachar. By succeeding his father, Bachar inherited the legacy of
Far from being “embittered by its isolation”, the regime’s intransigence is only “in character”; it is a product of the same bloody-mindedness that allowed the Alawites to rise to prominence in
No Alawite would ever pull out of
In any case, Today's world has moved on, and so did Western interests. In this optic, the same doggedness that allowed them to reach
Before you debate whether the United Stats should engage Syria or attack it, note the following fact; the operative words above are “Syrian Leader” and “Syrian Regime”. The entire logic changes when you recall that, Assad is a “Alawite Leader”, and his regime a “Alawite Regime”. This is your classical Syria we're fighting against...
Unfreezing the Middle Eeast
Oh, what a little word can do…
Indeed, the regime’s fight ceased to be about
Far fetched? Conspirational? Not really, only crassly sectarian. It is the same logic that would see a Hassan Nasrallah provoke Lebanon's destruction and ruin, only to rejoice at the rush of "pure pious money". This is beyond the "Arab el-3ezz" myth, we're in a world of tribes... Or in the case of Shater Hassan, the myth of the Mahdi's return, for whom so many Bassidji are gearing up to fight.
The analogy with the period that preceded Europe’s 16th Century religious wars and its "querelles d'Allemands" is striking; similarly to the Catholic Europe of the time, the Arab and Muslim world is similarly in a profound crisis, with long repressed problems boiling just under the surface. Just like his Tikriti doppelgänger, the Alawite regime has so undermined Syria that removing it will precipitate the region into chaos, a
The forces are already lining up in
By refusing reform and by continuing to play this as a zero-sum game, they are forcing others to follow suit. The “current officeholders” in Lebanon may have already more than caught up with them; in some ways there may be some truth to Hezb’s complaint that other militias are arming. But those are “legal” outfits that need not “shoot first”; they only need to wait for “March 8th” to move first, on a terrain already demarcated to “March 14th” advantage.
From a narrow Alawite perspective, this is not such a stupid move; far better than Iraqi Tikrit, Jabal Al-Nusairiyeh’s hold is secure over the cities that matter; Lattaquieh, Tartous, and Banias. As Lebanon bears the brunt of the fighting, and as
OK, the “
However, I think that it still applies in this case. In the context of the time,
In the context of
In a sense, he got the message from the successful Feb. 14th demo. As part of such a “dialogue”, the 3 Tenors left him relatively off the hoook in their speeches, but I still fear that “March 14th” may be unwilling to offer him an acceptable compromise. Doing this would be overreaching (again), thus storing more trouble for the future.
However, you cannot dialogue with Bachar, neither can you talk to Nasrallah/Iran.
Bachar does not care about
There may also be a character flaw; the Saudis are now convinced that the father was more "reasonable", and that the boy acts like a spoiled brat who "wants it all". Joumblat is no fool; you only cut “moawiya’s hair” with dead men.
You cannot dialogue with Nasrallah; his Holiness (CBUH) is far gone in his Millenarian quest for the Mahdi. At the very least, he owes too much to
At best, you can force Hezb to play by the rules, but you cannot convince them to do so of their own free will; they answer to a higher authority, above you or I, above any logic they have left, and above their conscience. An additional parameter is; how can Hezb guarantee its physical survival without its "holy weapons"? Can it trust the infidels, the
This is why I can only see a bad ending; when a situation becomes so entangled, only the sword can cut through such a Gordian knot.