With the tribunal now decided under Chapter 7, we are witnessing a truly historic moment, with fateful consequences, as Abu Kais hints; the “loud explosion” that “was just heard in Beirut” might as well be both “fireworks” and “the Assad regime responding”. To be sure, the government now has some measure of leverage to bring back sanity into Lebanese politics.
The country may come around to another historic moment, with enough cover to finish off Fath Al-Islam.
Most political parties have come around the tribunal decision.
It was understandable for Franjieh made his usual display of bravado, which may have contributed to convincing Aoun’s supporters that things had gone too far. Well, it was either that, or the electoral rout at the elections for the Order of Physicians; they chose the fight and painted it as plebiscite, only to be resoundingly trashed.
It was also understandable for the Nationalsozialistische Syrianen Leutepartei (a.k.a the PSNS) to oppose the tribunal. Their leadership went gone beyond their ideology calling for a Greater Syria, with which many may agree, to cast their lot with the Assad clan, an idea that has fewer objective followers, except those willing to suspend all logic.
One less understandable position remains; Hezb’s opposition to the tribunal. It may have more to do with the fact that it may be located in Ayanappa, that oasis of sin than with deeper interests…
Hezb’s Interests (The Optimists)
In analyzing Hezb’s latest moves, Abu Kais rightly states that this “is an existential battle for” them. It is indeed true that their tactical needs are merely “an attempt to adapt an entire country to fit their needs, in the most selfish and destructive way possible”.
To some extend, this is validated by the Daily Star’s Michael Young, who offers an excellent outline of their reasoning and that of the Iranians;
Larijani's plan is not so very different, in most of its aspects, than what Hizbullah is demanding today [but its] sequencing […] made his plan unworkable, as did the fact that Iran would like to see the Hariri tribunal effectively neutralized. However, two things were significant in the initiative, beyond what it meant for Hizbullah.
First, Larijani confirmed that
The second message was that it was
With that in mind, Nasrallah’s “speech last Friday may have” been only partly “a defense of Syrian interests”, particularly where it might lead “to the legitimization of military force when addressing Palestinian groups outside the camps, particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, which is under Syria's thumb”. There could also have been “sincerity in Nasrallah's warning to the army”, since the “the Syrians will almost certainly respond by encouraging Salafists in the Ain al-Hilweh camp in
Hezb’s Interests (The Pessimists)
There is a more pessimistic view. It was well outlined by FUBAR, in a contribution on the thread cited above. He points out that Hezb’s was not opposed to a tribunal that covered “assassinations committed between
It would have been politically expedient for Hezbollah to have agreed to a Lebanese tribunal, if it had nothing to fear from such a tribunal. It would have appeared reasonable, it would have appeared to have been making some concession to the majority calling for a reciprocal concession from the majority, and it would have appeared to the Lebanese people as a whole to be against assassination and for justice. It makes no sense for Hezbollah to trade all of that just to oppose the tribunal at every turn merely to aid
(1) Hezbollah also had something to fear from the tribunal
I fear the reasons are both, and then some.
Indeed, “higher up” political commentators would object that, rationally, Hezb has no other option but to come back into the mainstream Lebanese fold, and become exclusively political. Fat chance, either way; methinks there is more to it, and it goes to the core of what Hezb represents; their strategic aims are far more fundamental, and may even be far less “rational” (on which later).
Indeed, “higher up” political commentators would also add that, rationally, their Iranian patrons have no interest in wasting such a prized outfit, especially that they have spend so much money on it. Fat chance; methinks there is more to
Far From Over
Indeed, this is far from over; what we have seen so far was nothing but a dress rehearsal in three phases.
The 1st Phase was waking up the Palestinian Issue, and the heat on the security front, via terror attacks and Nahr El-Bared,
In this 3rd Phase, we see the final demarcations; they are now clear before the real “fun” begins. With March 14th on one side, March 8th (minus Aoun) on the other, and Aoun not too sure where to go from there…
I am sure that the Lebanese Army is doing in best, and the mere fact that it can function at at all given the sectarian divisions of
Now, It’s On…
How did I know, when I started this thread, about three phases? Well, we’ve seen it all before, back in …