The dynamics of this standoff would be interesting if the potential for bloodshed were not so real. it has undertones of the calm that preceded Europe descent into religious wars during the renaissance. In this context, Lebanon and Syria are nothing but the stage for a greater sectarian struggle, not only within Lebanon, but also over the entire "Fertile Crescent"...
Frozen Lebanon
Whether one blames HassAoun or Hariri, The Lebanese sectarian system has broken down; as each side develops their own media and identity, they will soon evolve separate economies. As each leader has now retreated to their own community, a pattern emerges; a communitarian alliance, grouped around “March 14th”, is facing off a challenge led by Hezb and the PSNS, with Aoun, Franjieh, and others reduced to mere fig leafs.
Nasrallah's not a revolution; Kamal Joumblat, who knew a thing or two about it, famously stated that a "revolution is about contributing something beautiful". Shater Hassan's whole mess can only go south, literally, Shater Hassan is not merely looking “outside” to balance the fast mounting hostility “inside”; he desperately needs a war to reinvigorate his long lost legitimacy. Following up on his instructions to revive the “resistance”, his minions are already probing, striving to find the best way to reignite Lebanon’s southern border. This is not the fist time UNIFIL's Spanish peacekeepers have been targeted; first on Jan. 18th, and now Feb. 18th, there may well be an escalating pattern there.
I fear more in March; it may all start with some new kidnappings, or a humble stone.
Thawing Syria
Whether we like or dislike the Syrian regime, we have to realize that they are forced to stick to their simple bottom line; Assad has little choice but to sticks to his uncompromising stance and “does not want to hear of the Hariri tribunal”. Unless you intend to talk about talking about it.
To outsiders, this obstinacy in sticking to such a maximalist position may seem baffling, but to anyone with a sense of history, this is the only logical option left to Bachar. By succeeding his father, Bachar inherited the legacy of Hama, and the blood of its 10,000 to 40,000 victims has now fallen on his hands. Any sign of “being reasonable” could be interpreted as weakness by the Alawite regime’s many opponents.
Far from being “embittered by its isolation”, the regime’s intransigence is only “in character”; it is a product of the same bloody-mindedness that allowed the Alawites to rise to prominence in Syria over the 1960’s and 1970’s. In this context, the moment UNSC 1559 was signed, Rafic Hariri’s fate was sealed, as Assad understood the inevitability of “a confrontation with the United States and France”. In this context, he moved to secure his “rear guard”.
No Alawite would ever pull out of Lebanon, leaving behind such a powerful Sunni leader, with a strong appeal to his brethren within Syria (70% of the population). No Baathist could tolerate a leader with such cross-sectarian appeal within, and without Lebanon, especially one who has won more minds than they could ever hope to brainwash. The late Kamal Joumblat had some of this, and Aoun had the potential, till he went over to the "dark side"...
In any case, Today's world has moved on, and so did Western interests. In this optic, the same doggedness that allowed them to reach Damascus is now hindering their continued control over it. In the context where any potential patrons are more interested in mercenary deal-making, the Syrian leader’s inflexibility as appears ill adapted to the new ecosystem. The Syrian regime is thawing under its own devices, melting away its own power over the country. What remains to be determined is the timing; before, or after the US election?
Before you debate whether the United Stats should engage Syria or attack it, note the following fact; the operative words above are “Syrian Leader” and “Syrian Regime”. The entire logic changes when you recall that, Assad is a “Alawite Leader”, and his regime a “Alawite Regime”. This is your classical Syria we're fighting against...
Unfreezing the Middle Eeast
Oh, what a little word can do…
Indeed, the regime’s fight ceased to be about Syria the moment it was forced out of Lebanon. This was not missed by Joumblat, with his diatribe on leviathans of seasons past. The Syrian rags may raise hell, and the "opposition" protest that "speeches to poison mediation efforts" (as if Nasrallah and his co-master Bachar never did such a thing) but that's just a political "rear guard" action; the fight is now about the Alawite Sanjak of Lattaquieh, and other fiefdoms of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Bkerke, Nabatieh, Baalbeck… In threatening to destroy Lebanon over Hariri’s head, Assad was actually threatening to destroy Syria.
Far fetched? Conspirational? Not really, only crassly sectarian. It is the same logic that would see a Hassan Nasrallah provoke Lebanon's destruction and ruin, only to rejoice at the rush of "pure pious money". This is beyond the "Arab el-3ezz" myth, we're in a world of tribes... Or in the case of Shater Hassan, the myth of the Mahdi's return, for whom so many Bassidji are gearing up to fight.
The analogy with the period that preceded Europe’s 16th Century religious wars and its "querelles d'Allemands" is striking; similarly to the Catholic Europe of the time, the Arab and Muslim world is similarly in a profound crisis, with long repressed problems boiling just under the surface. Just like his Tikriti doppelgänger, the Alawite regime has so undermined Syria that removing it will precipitate the region into chaos, a Fertile Crescent version of Europe’s 30-year war.
The forces are already lining up in Lebanon, and no, it is not nationalism. As Hezb provides the muscle and the PSNS the death squads, a Shiite-Alawite Alliance is effectively forming, with Persian blessing. Bachar and Nasrallah are ordering their communities’ ranks to “Vorwerts beschliesset eurer Glieder” like medieval pike formations of Europe’s religious wars.
By refusing reform and by continuing to play this as a zero-sum game, they are forcing others to follow suit. The “current officeholders” in Lebanon may have already more than caught up with them; in some ways there may be some truth to Hezb’s complaint that other militias are arming. But those are “legal” outfits that need not “shoot first”; they only need to wait for “March 8th” to move first, on a terrain already demarcated to “March 14th” advantage.
From a narrow Alawite perspective, this is not such a stupid move; far better than Iraqi Tikrit, Jabal Al-Nusairiyeh’s hold is secure over the cities that matter; Lattaquieh, Tartous, and Banias. As Lebanon bears the brunt of the fighting, and as Iran bears the brunt of the spending (with a decreasing oil price), they can thus secure their real bottom line, while we’re busy establishing the tribunal, rebuilding Beirut, or quenching the fires of Damascus…
Munich, anyone?
Follow-Up (Feb. 19th, 2007): Mea Culpa
OK, the “Munich cliché” is “overused”, as Patrick points out. Indeed, it is often misused to negate any dialogue and justify one side’s maximalist position, and hence ensure continued confrontation.
However, I think that it still applies in this case. In the context of the time, Munich was a mistake because the British were trying to negotiate with Hitler, who's bottom line was the enslavement of Europe. This was clearly nothing they could have commonly agreed on, rather than surrender outright.
In the context of Lebanon, you can dialogue with Aoun, at best; his main interest is the Presidency. From lofty beginnings, he has “cut himself down to size” thanks to his close association with Hezb. He may now prefer to “cut a deal” before being trounced thoroughly in the next elections. Indeed, while he still claims to speak "for the marginalized Christians" Herr General has been making conciliatory comments, stating that he "will personally sign [the treaty to create a Special International Tribunal for Lebanon] even if they did not listen to the Opposition's remarks".
In a sense, he got the message from the successful Feb. 14th demo. As part of such a “dialogue”, the 3 Tenors left him relatively off the hoook in their speeches, but I still fear that “March 14th” may be unwilling to offer him an acceptable compromise. Doing this would be overreaching (again), thus storing more trouble for the future.
However, you cannot dialogue with Bachar, neither can you talk to Nasrallah/Iran.
Bachar does not care about Damascus if you do not include Beirut in the package. His only interest in talking to you is that you allow him to come back to Lebanon, but is able to "offer" nothing in return, other than more terror and more assassinations. He cannot “disarm” Hezb, since this will go against Iran’s interests, and he cannot make peace with Israel, since the continuation of the struggle is his only claim to legitimacy.
There may also be a character flaw; the Saudis are now convinced that the father was more "reasonable", and that the boy acts like a spoiled brat who "wants it all". Joumblat is no fool; you only cut “moawiya’s hair” with dead men.
You cannot dialogue with Nasrallah; his Holiness (CBUH) is far gone in his Millenarian quest for the Mahdi. At the very least, he owes too much to Iran, who invested far too much in this outfit to see it disarmed/disbanded. I do not see a way for parties like the Hezb or the Ahbash to continue within the framework of a plural Lebanon.
At best, you can force Hezb to play by the rules, but you cannot convince them to do so of their own free will; they answer to a higher authority, above you or I, above any logic they have left, and above their conscience. An additional parameter is; how can Hezb guarantee its physical survival without its "holy weapons"? Can it trust the infidels, the United States and Israel, not to act against it?
This is why I can only see a bad ending; when a situation becomes so entangled, only the sword can cut through such a Gordian knot.
Sleiman Beyk’s Outburst
Most people are disappointed enough to stay away from politics, at least “those politics”, which definitely limits his “client base”. And not all Christians are disgusted enough by Aoun to follow Geagea, and many army towns such as Kobeyyat will never go to the “Hakim”, but the growth of the LF in 
In this respect, his little outburst is only an attempt at closing the clan’s ranks. He is trying to bring back the memories of his father, killed by Geagea, the Gemayels, and… Hobeika. I am not sure how he can explain befriending this last one… In any case, closing the ranks has been the fashion this past week, as we are gearing up for more escalation. Pardon;” civil disobedience”… 
The Bishop with his Sunday sermon appeared to be inching was “closing sectarian ranks”. Whether the Christians are arming again or not is irrelevant; they now have a reason to do so. 
Rather than splitting away, the Iranians and Syrians, appear to be closing ranks as well, with a new weapon in their arsenal; Photoshop! It beats killing defenceless civilians, and makes better news than throwing rocks are peacekeepers, and it has more “visibility” than shifting some troops around… So, if you can’t launch a satellite, you can make it look like you did; your supporters will believe you enough to gobble up those plastic keys, and rise to your defence.
