The battle in Nahr El-Bared is more than a firefight between the Army and some crazed lunatics. The army may be winning at great cost, and Mr. Jibril and his retinue may join in the fun, and this may escalate further as the recent bombings demonstrated.
The bombings in Ashrafieh and Verdun are more than attacks by Syrian mobsters against Lebanese freedom.
But this is not the worse of it…
I fear that there is more to it. No matter how bad this is, the real struggle could well be far worse, and the current battle may well prove to be a dress rehearsal for a far greater fight to come.
Arab Destiny…
On the longer run, that fight is not only about Lebanon’s future, but about the destiny of the Arab Soul, as part of the ideological war between Black Arabism and White Arabism.
This is no mere grandstanding; ever since the advent of the Ottoman Tanzimat, the deep conflicting currents within the Arab world have always surfaced in Lebanon, as Arabs struggled to embrace the modern world and come to terms with their own history.
Similarly to Europe in the 19th Century, the current struggle has always been between two broad camps; progressives and conservatives, each one a motley crew of varied alliances. My own bias notwithstanding, the current struggle more complex and far more than about mere worker’s rights, as simplistic Lefties may have you think.
The aspect that concerns us today is the immediate events unfolding in Lebanon, with the Lebanese Armed Forces struggling against Fath Al-Islam, Security Forces struggling against terror attacks… All this, in the context of infiltrations directed and sponsored by a Syrian regime who seems hell-bent on interpreting openings as either weakness or blan seign. As Tony and AllahPundit put it;
“So now you see how 'productive' Pelosi’s — and Rice’s — outreach to Damascus has been [...] Talking is not consequence-free, contrary to the prevailing punditry“
Lebanese Destiny
Our immediate context is Lebanon’s destiny. And yes, to the risk of sounding like a broken “March 14th” record; it is ALL about the Hariri tribunal.
In this context, the tribunal issue is the culmination of a fight between Progressives and Conservatives. This is not a straight forward fight; neither are the progressive all on the side of “White Arabism”, nor are the conservatives all Nasserite “Black Arabists”. The stakes will not change, but many parties will switch sides as the sectarian rapport de force is adjusted after the dust settles.
For this reason, we have to add an “in between” Lebanese camp. Its members will either serve useful idiots or become great heroes, depending on the timing of their actions, and the support they get.
The Progressives
The word “progressive” is overused, with as many definitions as there are fields of human activity, or the lack of it. By the dictionary definition:
“Promoting or favoring progress toward better conditions or new policies, ideas, or methods”.
Many forget that Aoun’s partisans were the first progressives, yearning to break the “order” established by the United States under the Pax Syriana. This brought us to March 14th, when all of us, save for Hezb and Amal, were progressives. Aoun has now moved away from the progressive camp, and the main contenders for the label are Hairiri, Joumblat and Geagea, backed by the Saudis and most Arabs. Some of those 11th hour progressives are lowlifes who “turned coats” in the nick of time, as a new master came to Damascus and Syria’s fortunes were changing…
Their conversion had started after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal, the sole purpose of Hezb’s “resistance” became (for optimists) its own self-perpetuation, reinforced by its own social network, the party was taking over the country… As Southern Lebanon was freed by one occupier, the rest of the country fell deeper under the yoke of another one. This was not to the liking of many powerful interests,; as the situation had changed, so did their interests, and they were soon gravitating towards the “progressive” camp.
The Conservatives
The established disorder has many partisans. The definition above, from their perspective, becomes;
“Promoting or favoring progress toward [what one considers are] better conditions or new policies, ideas, or methods”.
To many conservatives, the established order is nice; this is why the French CGT likes Segolen, and why Hezb likes Syria… They were doing well, thank you; to them, “progress” is a matter of perspective.
In Lebanon, thanks to the “Free World’s” complacency and short-sightedness, a new regional order has emerged, under the extortionist yoke of all the lowlifes whose only skill is playing Quislings, or committing murder and making mayhem.
Things are changing now. Initially, the Syrians had a measure of support within the House of Saoud and the British. Their Quislings drew much solace from it, but it all blew away when the bomb that killed Hariri; Saudi Arabia was now solidly opposed to the Assad clan’s interests. Even the so far lenient British are now slowly moving away from their seat on the fence, if you consider the Economist as a good Barometer;
Although Syria has denied any connection to the assassinations, or to the current violence, there is evidence to support the charges against it. […] During Syria's long occupation most of Lebanon's 12 Palestinian camps were directly controlled by Syrian military intelligence. Syrian intelligence also infiltrated several radical jihadist groups, using them for dirty work both in Lebanon and in Iraq (against American troops). The leader of Fatah al Islam, whose ideology is close to that of al-Qaeda, is known to have been held in Syrian custody before resurfacing in Lebanon in 2005. Since then the group has recruited not only among Lebanon's 400,000 Palestinian refugees, many of whom are destitute and disillusioned by the failure of secular groups to better their lot, but also among international jihadists.
The Syrians may be on their way to losing the “Palestinian” lever, at great cost to braver nations as both the Palestinians and Lebanese are set to suffer. Its renunciation of Fath Al-Islam may become more than mere rhetoric when/if the Lebanese Army is done with them.
Syria will be left with few other real levers than Hezb, now a key component of their defence strategy. It had not always been thus; initially, the resistance to Israel was a progressive act of sorts, but it was taken over by Hezb; after imposing itself on the Civil War scene, the party more than “took the lead” from the “secular” groups who had carried out the first operations. This was no mere “passing the flag”, as Hezb actively sidelined other parties with heavy Syrian help. Having first brutally repressed the party, Hafez El-Assad made a deal with Iran and streamlined his sponsorship operations. It allowed Hezb a measure of exclusive control over Southern Lebanon, at the expense of other movements.
Those in Between
The “in-between” here would be mainly Aoun and the Palestinians. Understandably, some would be excused to add Joumblat, our national chameleon champion, but he is merely an excellent indicator of the direction of the political winds… It is a fool that opposes the storm; statesmen bend and wait for better times.
Today, Aoun finds himself among the “useful idiots”. Whether it is due to a spiteful personality or sheer stupidity, he has little justification. He is right in pointing out the intelligence failures. He is also right in pointing out that the current government had, within it, some of the elements that made possible today’s current morass. But he is wrong on the fundamentals, he far too readily forgets that much of it is due to his new partner’s continuing hold over some security services, their sabotage of others, their infiltration of the armed forces, and their role in bringing about the current mess.
The Palestinians are still playing a swing role; for all the support they have given the Lebanese Armed Forces, many of their “men on the ground” remain dubious at best. They have their own safety to worry about… It is true, however, that the Army’s operations show a worrying lag of planning and vision. It is also true that we Lebanese share the blame for the sorry lot of our Palestinian brethren, having restricted them to camps and forbidden them from (officially) working.
But it also the fact that their leaders have contributed much to the current morass. Arafat S.à.R.T.L, held sway over Lebanon in the 60’s and 70’s. Heck, they may have even played a role in Koreiche’s accession to the Maronite Patriarchate! The Pope even had to promote him away to Cardinal, to “bring in” the current Patriarch…
But they were all too happy to maintain a ready pool of cannon fodder, and blocked many an attempt to improve the fundamentals of the camps’ economies.
What Does it all Mean?
With all those neighbours and “friends”, No wonder we Lebanese often quip that Lebanon’s best neighbour is the Mediterranean Sea; it has not invaded us yet…
Until the next (real) Tsunami, that is…
When it comes to the immediate problem at hand, I am not sure whether it is too late for integration.
I am not sure if there is more to Fath Al-Islam than meets the eye. Robert Fisk asks a few good questions, and raises one side of the veil hiding the cesspool under Lebanon’s glitz;
And who were the dead men I saw yesterday, perforated by bullets, partly torn open by grenades? Silent testimony is all we receive from the dead. One of them had big eyes above his fluffy beard, eyes which stared at us and at the police who jeered at his corpse. I wonder if they will not come to haunt us soon. And if we will discover what lies behind this terrible day in Lebanon
Unfortunately, Fisk is too strongly influenced by Hersh’s sophistic stupidity, which has been discredited countless times by so many others.
What Now?
One can never be certain as to the future impact of immediate events. But one can be dead certain of what immediate actions are needed; the best we can do is stick to first-principles, regardless of the “short-term” rewards...
In this case, I am damn sure it is too late to ask the Lebanese to give a hoot, or to demand our armed forces exert restraint. And I am dead certain that traditional half-measures, are the last thing we need. I am also dead certain that a repeat of 1973, no matter who “engineered” this one, will only usher in another 1975;
Lebanon’s got to win this at all costs
Lebanon’s got to Finish off those bastard
Failing that, Lebanon will die (not) trying.
And it would be deservedly so…
