A dialogue by other means…
And herein lays the key problem; the Military cannot be a solution, and they can never offer any.
Today’s Spartans forget that, for all their ingeniousness, self-sacrifice, abnegation, and bravery, they can only aspire to be a tool of policy. A tool that complements diplomacy;
"War is the continuation of politics through other means. The military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm” the enemy: “to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent."
The nice thing about military tools is that they allow those who wield them to reach their objectives much faster. The efficacy of the use of military force is the bluntness of the message; the bluntness of the sword can simply cut the sharpest pen or the most eloquent of microphones.
But once it does so, once it meets its objectives, the tables are turned; the sharpness of the pen becomes more relevant. This is especially the case if the political objectives are clearly defined in the first place. In the case of the “Resistance”, since the shy away from publicly advertising their real goal (or those of their masters), their objectives are currently defined as the means themselves; the “Divine Weapons”.
The Objective is the Means
Hezb’s has achieved its military objectives in its latest coup. Yes, it took control over
But now that it has done so, the actual limitations of its policy are appearing; it has nothing new to offer, no real solution to propose.
Now that those modern Spartans have achieved success, they are failing to develop a vision for the “after”. Yes, they know the sectarian threshold have been crossed. . Yes, they know they need to “engage” Sunnis and “reconcile” with them.
But they lack the means to do it. Their “Divine Weapons” are getting in the way, and the cost of keeping them is rising…
The Institutional Aspect
That would not be a problem in the limited context of
Even if 14 حمار cowers in the face of 8 حمار's diktat, Hezb is fighting a rear-guard action to conserve diminishing assets. The state’s bureaucracy, egged on by many, will continue encroaching on Nasrallah’s “Divine Domain”.
In the immediate, Nasrallah will do his Faqihest to enshrine his Divine Weapons in a new government statement. His goons recently wielded their military arguments again, but all the AK’s and RPG’s cannot hide the fact that, beyond this, Nasrallah has no other policy on offer.
He has nothing more than the threat of another “Military Solution”.
The Military Aspect
Faced with a growing hostility to this Military exclusivity, Nasrallah now faces the need to consolidate his powerbase by formalizing his state within a state. As he does so, the unconventional resistance is slowly turning into a conventional army, much like Arafat’s PLO did, once it secured its Fatahland.
The “Resistance” is turning into yet another occupying force. And much like the PLO, the “Resistance” is fixing its assets, digging in among an increasingly hostile Lebanese population. This is a tendency our neighbours may actually encourage;
"Some of the changes [Hezb] is undergoing oblige it to move from the form of a [guerrilla force] to the characteristics of a conventional army. This is the case in its deployment, its weaponry and also in terms of command and control. This transition is not entirely advantageous for [Hezb]. It deprives it of some of the advantages it had as an elusive body that strikes at the civilian population and hides behind the back of the civilian population."
But the stakes today is far more complex, and the implications far more dangerous. Back then, the PLO was a foreign body manned by foreigners. Today, Hezb may be a foreign tool, but it is manned by people who are just as Lebanese as anyone of us.
Interesting talks ahead...