under the state wing
Back to a sectarian nightmare.
And the tea leaves of this witches brew make interesting reading, both internally and externally.
There are signs that each “side” in the Lebanese “equation” is now looking past D’oha; the Sunnis are circling the wagons, the Druze are hedging, and Christians are capitalizing on this.
The Sunnis appear to be changing gear, particularly in the north. Regardless of the Saad’s great resources, it appears that many are now considering the possibility of a post-Hariri era. Ahdab has been manoeuvring himself closer to the Salafis, and has been growing increasingly vocal of late. Fatfat is already “there”, his political base shored up in one of the fastest growing demographic segments.
Not many cannons, but a lotta fodder.
The Druze are hedging. To them, post-Hariri does not necessarily mean pre-Bashar. However, while the Syrian dictator is weaker than he appears, unable to protect his own, he still has the potential to do us much harm thanks to his alliance with Hezb. Joumblat finds himself on the crossroads; having defeated hezb militarily, he’s now focusing on extracting the best tactical “deal” he can. Because of Western duplicity, they have little choice in the matter.
ألف قلبه و لا غلب
The Christians are now in flux, divided between Aoun’s allegiance with Hezb, and Geageas’ alignment with the Hariris. Whoever wins the battle for hearts and minds of this segment of the population will win
Their perennial division is protection... For now.
Among all those, only Aoun appears to be planning for elections in June ‘09; his FPM ministers will be working hard to dole out patronage in the hope to regain much diminished lustre. However, even if Hezb allows any elections to proceed on June 09, for all Ziad Baroud’s democratic leanings, they will be neither free, nor fair. And this is what it appears Geagea is expecting; to him, the post-Hariri does not mean pre-Hezb. he can prepare safely for now, for two reasons; Hezb is too busy learning lessons form their Chouf debacle, and they cannot confront him directly without damaging Aoun.
The external signs all indicate that everyone is now looking, beyond the post-Hariri era, to the post-Lebanon era. At least, to a
1- Hezb’s policy is now official Lebanese policy. Which means that UNSC 1701 is dead, since Lebanese will move away from its obligations under UNSC 1559;
Lebanese officials from the president down had always legitimized Hizbullah's resistance as a national cause. "This time, a vehemently anti-Hizbullah government - led by a majority that has significant Western support - has put its signature to a clause that allows Hizbullah to take actions in the fields listed without seeking government approval. It also puts an end to any dreams of disarming Hizbullah. It secures Hizbullah's armed existence."
And this means that he 1949 Armistice is also effectively dead. The only thing preventing
Who though D’Oha was so close to Cairo?
2- If the perception that Hezb’s has taken over Lebanon continues to get more “traction”, then it is
No wonder everyone is moving post-Hariri. They all realize that, “without strong state institutions, the state cannot be strong”, but the net results of their policies ensures that it’s not much of a state anyway.
Interesting times ahead.
It now all hinges on Hezb. This was their best year ever, and perhaps their golden age. So, as they reach the zenith of their expansion, will they capitalize on their success and extract an optimal deal for their “side”? Or will they drag us to war by continuing their push beyond the limits of the possible?
It is more likely that they will go on pushing further; they didn't come that far by merely playing along with the band...