As we gear up for the summit, Syria assures us that all it wants is peace…
Peace Indeed
More accurately; all Syria wants is this piece of land we call Lebanon. In this, the current regime is no different from any of the regimes that preceded it by refusing to recognize Lebanon and calling for the reunification of this “wayward province” into the Syrian fold. With this in mind, Al Hayat’s recent editorial put the whole debate about the Summit in the right perspective;
The fact of the matter is that it is an extensive accumulation of the resistance towards dealing with "Lebanon the State", whether from the Lebanese side - currently represented by the Opposition - or by "Syria the State", which is attempting to correct the "historical mistake" of announcing "Greater Lebanon" at the beginning of the past century.
The behaviour of the current regime is made worse by the country’s identity crisis and its rulers’ lack of legitimacy.
In the Beginning Was The Baath…
It had first started as a “minority rule” under the Baath’s “Military Committee”, a joint Alawite-Druze affair. Then it evolved into a Alawite takeover of the country under Assad, after he dispatched other Druze officers such as Salim Hatoum. As Assad’s power rose, his power base shrank as a proportion of the Syrian population.
Having no “internal” pull to attract supporters, Assad-the-father had to resort to an “external” push.
Until 1973, Israel’s suppression of Palestinian aspirations played an effective role in mobilizing in support of the regime. After that, and especially after Egypt dropped out of the “Arab struggle” in 1978, the regime had to find its legitimacy somewhere else. By then, we Lebanese had come to the regime’s rescue; having started to rip each other apart in 1974-1975, we provided an easy avenue for Syrian involvement. They came in first on the “progressive” side via fronts such the “Saika”. After “victories” such as the massacre of Christians in Damour, they switched sides to the “American” allied “Isolationists” in ’76, then back to the “Progressives” in ’78…
And the game continued until they were allowed (by those same Americans) almost total control of Lebanon. But that was back in ’90-’91, when Saddam was “liberating” Kuwait on his way to “free” Palestine of those evil Zionists.
Like Father, Like Son?
Today, Assad-the-Son is struggling to repeat his father’s feats, and studiously going though the bloody pages of the “Book of Hafez”. He is now supporting a “progressive” opposition in the face of a “regressive” government whom his lackeys characterise as an “Zionist/American” creation, a “cancerous sore”.
But today’s fundamentals are different, and Assad-The-Father’s policies are not adapted to the mew context; the region has changed.
With the cold war over, the United States find themselves the only power in the region’s oil fields. And with the Sunni domination over Iraq gone, the Arabs find themselves in “direct contact” with the Persians. In such a context, both the United States and the Arabs feel threatened by Syria’s constant alignment with Iran. And this leaves Syria with few local cards; the Sunnis are not on board, the Palestinians are not playing along (for the most part, at least), and Christian are sidelined thanks(?) to their divisions.
Risk of Contagion
So Assad-the-Son can move his toys around, but he can do little else. Yes, Siniora may be a weak leader, but he’s no Schuschnigg, thanks to all that Western Support. Yes, Lebanon may not be present at the (irrelevant?) Arab summit, but with the absence of the Arabs, no Chamberlain will be attending. Yes, Israelis may not actively oppose Bashar’s policies in their quest of “peace” with Syria, but they are holding off support, at least until ‘09… And yes, there are some idiots and hacks left in the United States, but they are increasingly ineffective.
So Assad-the-Son can do little or risk exposing himself and pushing more on Lebanon’s division, and thus provoking a Sunni-Shiite war. Yet such a move would be ill-advised, as that could be uniquely contagious. And far more dangerous; the son’s regime is far weaker than the father’s.
For one, the minority ruling group bequeathed by Assad-the-Father has shrunk to “family and friends”. This process recently accelerated during the son’s accession, with the sidelining of the likes of Khaddam and Shehabi, the assassination of Hariri, and the “suicide” of Kanaan and his brother. Underneath this solid facade, the Syrian regime’s power base is shrinking fast and Alawite unity is further eroding; witness the latest string of arrests in Qardaha, the Assad’s hometown.
For another, 21st Century Syria is much poorer. With the “occupation rents” from Lebanon gone, the army’s sources of patronage are diminished. The regime also has to contend with shrinking oil reserves, and Syria will soon become a net oil importer. Unable to develop its oil industry any further, the regime will struggle to reform a “state dominated” economy, and a growing population will find less and less employment.
Iranian cash is helping, for now, but even that well is not bottomless. But this alliance may well be one of the main reasons of the regime’s long term weakness. This weakness is made worse by the results of the Hama massacre, which ensured that the regime’s rule will always have sectarian underpinnings. And the weakness is now further weakened by isolation.
True, in the sectarian context, the minority Alawites had little choice but to align with (Shiite dominated) Iran, to use as leverage against the rest of the (Sunni dominated) Arab world. But the Arabs now fear for their oil, and building alliances to face the Persian threat.
Joumblat’s Sensing the Change
No wonder Joumblat increasingly calls for the regime’s change. Such assertiveness has less to do with Lebanese masses, and he would not dare risk a backlash against Syria’s Druze if he did not perceive the regime’s inherent weakness. Now, this Syrian regime has wasted much time, and cannot realistically return to Lebanon unless they are willing (or able) to change… But chances are events will change it.
As long as the regime maintains its present course, it will have no option but to retreat from Damascus back a (much improved) Alawite heartland, and delay its grand plans about a “Greater Syria”…
Anschluß delayed is Anschluß denied…
…At least for now.