As they achieve repeated successes, they soon become to believe that, by constantly reapplying the same formula, they will continuously be able to achieve success by the same means. However, their once-novel methods soon become “conventional” themselves, and a form of “doctrinal complacency” sets, reinforced by the ever increasing success. Such was the case in July 2006, when
This is the case of Hezb’O today; its victory in July 2006 led it to an increasingly dominant position in
However, in doing so, Hezb is only exacerbating a “power dilemma”; the success of its offensive policy will create ever stronger incentives to strike first, since a successful attack will usually so weaken the other side that victory will tend to be relatively quick, bloodless, and decisive. This is what happened during their invasion of
As it continued in this conquest phase, Hezb has consolidated “internally” by eliminating or sidelining “barons”, and is now expand “externally”. Its “external” expansion is now carried out as part of the elections, in which they are leading Aoun’s electoral offensive in the Christian. Whatever the final result, ShaterHassan’s allies would be sure to score quite a few points.
But Iran’s power grab over Lebanon will be far from secure, and the downside will come soon enough; as the successes accumulate, Hezb’s doctrines will be increasingly informed by the rose-colored lens of previous victories. Repeated victories make this offensive approach an easier choice because of the belief in the possibility of quick victory as well as the belief that failure to act will expose them to unacceptable risk.
This doctrine of action will become increasingly rigid, and the party will become ever less likely to change and adapt. As previous victories are celebrated, a culture of victory is increasingly emphasizing certainty in outcomes. Because this certainty belies the complicated sets of factors that allowed victory in previous engagements, Hezb is increasingly developing a “static conception” of political struggle that does not allow for change on the part of its adversaries. Soon enough, those adversaries will learn to exploit the weaknesses thus exposed, exposing dominants to defeat at the hands of inferior parties.
Regardless of the result of this upcoming election, little will fundamentally change because of both the institutional dysfunctions of